Corestates Bank v. Huls America Inc by unknown
1999 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-11-1999 
Corestates Bank v. Huls America Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999 
Recommended Citation 
"Corestates Bank v. Huls America Inc" (1999). 1999 Decisions. 118. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999/118 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1999 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed May 11, 1999 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
NO. 97-1784 
 
CORESTATES BANK, N.A., 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
HULS AMERICA, INC. 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 96-cv-08119) 
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III 
 
Argued: July 17, 1998 
 
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, STAPLETON and WEIS, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed May 11, 1999) 
 
       WALTER WEIR, JR., ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       Weir & Partners 
       100 So. Broad Street 
       Suite 1200 - Land Title Building 
       Philadelphia, PA 19110 
 
       Counsel for Appellant 
 
 
  
       DAVID J. D'ALOIA, ESQUIRE 
       VINCENT F. PAPALIA, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       ADAM S. RAVIN, ESQUIRE 
       Saiber, Schlesinger, Satz & 
        Goldstein, LLC 
       One Gateway Center, 13th Floor 
       Newark, NJ 07102-5311 
 
       EDWARD J. DiDONATO, ESQUIRE 
       DiDonato & Winterhalter 
       1818 Market Street, 29th Floor 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
       Counsel for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This appeal by CoreStates Bank, N.A. ("CoreStates") 
requires us to consider the putative claim preclusive effect 
of the Bankruptcy Judge's denial of CoreStates's objections 
to a Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization plan 
confirmation. Both CoreStates and appellee Huls America, 
Inc. ("Huls") had extended substantial credit to the debtor, 
United Chemical Technologies, Inc. ("UCT"), a chemical 
separation science company, to facilitate the purchase by 
UCT of a manufacturing facility from Huls. They then 
entered into a Subordination Agreement in order to clarify 
their respective rights to receive payment from UCT. Under 
the Agreement, UCT's debts to Huls were subordinated to 
CoreStates's. Huls also agreed that it would not retain any 
payment by UCT, including those paid under a bankruptcy 
plan, until UCT had paid off its indebtedness to CoreStates 
in full. 
 
After UCT filed for bankruptcy, but before the Plan of 
Reorganization was finally confirmed, UCT paid to Huls 
some $600,000 as called for by the Plan. CoreStates 
demanded that Huls pay this sum over to it. CoreStates 
filed objections to the Plan on the grounds, inter alia, that 
the Plan entitled Huls to receive $600,000 immediately, 
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asserting that this proposed payment unfairly discriminated 
between creditors. CoreStates did not contend to the 
Bankruptcy Judge that the $600,000 had to be paid over to 
it pursuant to the Subordination Agreement. 
 
Subsequently, CoreStates filed the present suit in the 
District Court, alleging that Huls is obligated by the 
Subordination Agreement to turn the $600,000 over to 
CoreStates. The issue on appeal is whether CoreStates has 
a right to receive the funds, when both CoreStates's and 
Huls's rights in the bankruptcy estate, and CoreStates's 
objection based on the payment in particular, were settled 
in the confirmation proceeding. The District Court 
concluded that CoreStates's claim was precluded because 
CoreStates could have raised its claim based on the 
Agreement in the bankruptcy proceeding alongside its 
objection, but failed to do so. See CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. 
Huls America, Inc., No. Civ. A. 96-8119, 1997 WL 560193 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 1997). 
 
This case is difficult because it falls within the interstices 
of the law of judgments. As discussed below, a Bankruptcy 
Judge's order rejecting a creditor's objection to a 
bankruptcy reorganization plan acts as a final judgment for 
preclusion purposes. In this case, CoreStates objected to 
the Plan because it would result in the immediate payment 
of $600,000 to Huls, and its objection seems to subsume 
the Subordination Agreement, even though it was not 
advanced in terms. As a result, both issue preclusion and 
claim preclusion might have some relevance to the present 
litigation, which concerns whether Huls is obligated by the 
Subordination Agreement to turn the $600,000 over to 
CoreStates. We think that claim preclusion provides the 
more appropriate framework, however, because we are 
unsure that the Subordination Agreement was raised with 
sufficient clarity in the reorganization proceeding to give 
rise to issue preclusion. 
 
Claim preclusion bars a party from litigating a claim that 
it could have raised or did raise in a prior proceeding in 
which it raised another claim based on the same cause of 
action. Agreeing with three other circuits (two are of the 
contrary view), we conclude that the doctrine applies 
regardless of the type of bankruptcy jurisdiction-- core or 
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non-core -- within which the current claim would fall. 
Moreover, we believe that the facts of this case-- 
particularly where the parties were formerly creditors in a 
bankruptcy proceeding -- fall within the rubric of claim 
preclusion, albeit at the margin. 
 
Although our holding is largely fact-bound, insofar as we 
bring it within the claim preclusion jurisprudence we are 
obliged to flesh out its doctrinal aspect. We note in this 
regard the limiting effects on these precepts of the internal 
elements of the claim preclusion test itself, set forth in 
Board of Trustees of Trucking Employees Welfare Fund, Inc. 
v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 1992), and of the 
statutory constraints on the scope of bankruptcy 
jurisdiction. First, claim preclusion applies only if the 
current claim would have been within the jurisdiction of the 
court hearing the prior bankruptcy proceeding. A claim, in 
order to fall within the bankruptcy jurisdiction, must at 
least be one that "could conceivably have any effect on the 
estate being administered in bankruptcy." Pacor, Inc. v. 
Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984). Second, except 
possibly in certain unusual circumstances, claim 
preclusion applies only if the party to be precluded raised 
a claim, such as an objection to a reorganization plan, in a 
prior proceeding. Finally, claim preclusion applies only if 
the events underlying the current claim are essentially 
similar to those underlying the claim made in the 
bankruptcy proceeding. If the current claim alleged to be 
precluded does not meet these three requirements it will 
not be precluded. 
 
CoreStates's claim clearly meets these three 
requirements. First, it could have raised its claim under the 
Subordination Agreement during the confirmation 
proceeding along side its objections, both as a legal and as 
a factual matter. The claim based on the Subordination 
Agreement fell within the non-core "related to" bankruptcy 
jurisdiction, if not the core jurisdiction. In addition, since 
UCT paid Huls the money before the Plan was confirmed, 
CoreStates's claim accrued before the confirmation 
proceeding concluded. Second, CoreStates filed an objection 
to the confirmation of UCT's Plan of Reorganization that 
was argued at length before the Bankruptcy Judge and the 
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District Court by both CoreStates and Huls. This objection 
put into controversy the entire amount that Huls was to 
receive in full satisfaction of its claims against UCT. Third, 
CoreStates's objection to the confirmation of the Plan 
involved the same underlying factual issues as CoreStates's 
present claim. We therefore conclude that the District Court 
correctly found that CoreStates's claim was precluded; 
hence we will affirm. 
 
I. Facts & Procedural History 
 
This case arises out of a series of events culminating in 
the bankruptcy reorganization of UCT. See CoreStates 
Bank, N.A. v. United Chem. Techs., Inc., 202 B.R. 33 (E.D. 
Pa. 1996). In 1993, UCT purchased from Huls a facility that 
manufactured specialty chemicals.1 This purchase was 
funded in part by loans and extensions of credit from 
CoreStates, totaling about $1.1 million.2  Huls also provided 
financing for the purchase and, after the sale, continued to 
supply products to UCT on credit terms. As a condition of 
the financing, CoreStates, UCT and Huls executed a 
Subordination Agreement ("the Agreement"). The Agreement 
provided, in part, that Huls would subordinate its claims to 
CoreStates's and would not retain any payment by UCT 
until UCT's indebtedness to CoreStates had been paid off in 
full. It further provided that, if any bankruptcy proceeding 
was filed by or against UCT, Huls would hold any payments 
it received pursuant to that proceeding as trustee for the 
benefit of CoreStates and deliver such payments 
immediately to CoreStates. 
 
As a consequence of an explosion at UCT's new facility, 
UCT filed for Chapter 11 protection in October 1995. UCT 
filed its first Plan of Reorganization in February 1996. This 
plan met with resistance from a number of interested 
parties, including Huls and CoreStates. Following further 
negotiations, UCT submitted a First Amended Plan of 
Reorganization in March 1996. The Amended Plan had the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. During the pendency of this litigation, Huls America changed its name 
to Creanova, Inc. We continue to refer to the defendant herein as Huls. 
 
2. During the pendency of this litigation, CoreStates merged into First 
Union Corp. We continue to refer to the plaintiff herein as CoreStates. 
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consent of all interested parties except CoreStates, which 
objected to it. 
 
Under the Amended Plan, CoreStates was to receive a 
cash payment of $550,497 on the Plan's effective date, and 
repayment of remaining lines of credit and mortgages with 
interest over periods ranging from five to fifteen years. 
CoreStates would also retain all its liens and security 
interests, except for certain machinery and equipment 
liens. Huls, a creditor with a priority junior to CoreStates, 
was to receive a $600,000 cash payment in full satisfaction 
of its more than $3.2 million in claims, approximately $2.3 
million of which was secured. Nothing in the Amended Plan 
purported to modify or nullify the Agreement as between 
CoreStates and Huls. 
 
CoreStates filed an action in the form of objections to the 
Amended Plan. These objections did not refer to the 
Agreement. CoreStates did, however, specifically object on 
the grounds that under the Plan Huls was entitled to 
receive $600,000 immediately. CoreStates argued that this 
proposed payment to Huls unfairly discriminated between 
creditors. 
 
On June 5, 1996, the Bankruptcy Judge rejected 
CoreStates's objections. One week later, he held a 
confirmation hearing. Just prior to the hearing, counsel for 
CoreStates informed counsel for Huls that CoreStates 
intended to enforce Huls's obligation to turn over the 
proceeds that it would receive under the Plan. At the 
confirmation hearing, Huls raised the issue with the court, 
and a brief colloquy ensued, although no papers were filed. 
The court did not formally resolve the issue, however, and 
proceeded to confirm the Plan over CoreStates's objection. 
 
CoreStates appealed the order confirming the Amended 
Plan to the District Court. See CoreStates, 202 B.R. 33. 
Among other issues, CoreStates argued that the 
Bankruptcy Judge improperly rejected its objection by 
wrongly "[d]etermining that [Huls] was permitted to receive 
payments . . . before [CoreStates] was paid, in 
contravention of the Subordination Agreement," thereby 
violating 11 U.S.C. S 510(a) and the "fair and equitable" 
requirement of 11 U.S.C. S 1129(b)(1) & (2). In fact, Huls 
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itself filed a brief in opposition to CoreStates's appeal, and 
CoreStates filed a reply brief responding almost exclusively 
to Huls's arguments. The District Court refused to consider 
this argument. It found that CoreStates had not raised the 
Agreement as a basis for objecting to the Amended Plan in 
the Bankruptcy Court, and therefore was not entitled to 
raise it before the District Court. See CoreStates, 202 B.R. 
at 48. The Court also rejected CoreStates's more general 
contention that the $600,000 payment unfairly 
discriminated against it, which Huls discussed at length in 
its brief. For other reasons, however, the court reversed the 
confirmation of the Plan. See 202 B.R. at 58. 
 
On August 12, 1996, prior to the ruling of the District 
Court, UCT paid to Huls the $600,000 sum called for by 
the Amended Plan.3 On September 6, CoreStates made a 
written demand on Huls for the money. In that letter, 
CoreStates asserted that, as a result of the District Court's 
vacatur of the Amended Plan, there was no confirmed plan 
and therefore Huls was required to pay the money over to 
CoreStates per the Agreement. Huls refused. 
 
UCT filed a Second Amended Plan on September 19. The 
Second Amended Plan altered the Amended Plan only with 
respect to CoreStates. It restored some of CoreStates's 
existing liens, which had been eliminated under the 
Amended Plan. It did not, however, purport to change 
either CoreStates's rights vis a vis Huls or the payment 
Huls was to receive. CoreStates objected to the Second 
Amended Plan as well. It stated a number of grounds for 
objecting, but did not invoke the Subordination Agreement, 
except by generalized incorporation. The Bankruptcy Judge 
again confirmed the Plan over CoreStates's objections. 
CoreStates did not appeal the confirmation of the Second 
Amended Plan. 
 
In December 1996, CoreStates filed the present diversity 
action in the District Court, which had jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. S 1332. Huls moved to dismiss the complaint for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. CoreStates had previously requested a stay of the Amended Plan in 
order to prevent UCT from paying Huls the $600,000. This request was 
based in part on the Agreement. The Bankruptcy Court denied the 
request without addressing the Agreement. 
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failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), or, in 
the alternative, for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(c). CoreStates responded with a motion for 
summary judgment. The District Court granted Huls's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied 
CoreStates's motion for summary judgment. See 
CoreStates, 1997 WL 560193, at *4. The court held that the 
doctrine of claim preclusion barred CoreStates's claim, 
reasoning that the claims CoreStates raises in the present 
case could have been raised during the UCT bankruptcy 
proceeding. See 1997 WL 560193, at *3-*4. CoreStates 
timely appeals from this decision. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
This court exercises plenary review over a district court's 
order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). See Kruzits v. Okuma 
Mach. Tool, Inc., 40 F.3d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 1994). Under Rule 
12(c), a district court cannot grant judgment on the 
pleadings, and we may not affirm such a grant, "unless the 
movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact 
remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." Kruzits, 40 F.3d at 54 (quoting 
Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 
290 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Society Hill Civic Assn. v. 
Harris, 632 F.2d 1045, 1054 (3d Cir. 1980) (citation 
omitted))). 
 
II. Claim Preclusion and Bankruptcy Proceedings 
 
The central issue in this appeal is the claim preclusive 
effect of the Bankruptcy Judge's final order of confirmation, 
over CoreStates's objection, on CoreStates's claim against 
Huls. In the confirmation proceeding, CoreStates objected 
to the Plan as unfair in part because it provided for the 
immediate payment of $600,000 to Huls, a junior creditor. 
CoreStates's present claim is that the Subordination 
Agreement requires Huls to pay to CoreStates the $600,000 
Huls received pursuant to the now-confirmed 
Reorganization Plan. A strong argument can be made that 
CoreStates's unfairness objection so clearly implicated the 
Agreement that the issue that divides the parties in the 
present case was effectively raised and litigated in the 
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bankruptcy proceeding, so that we are dealing here with 
issue preclusion rather than claim preclusion.4 Since the 
District Court and the parties have treated this case as 
involving primarily claim preclusion, however, and claim 
preclusion is the most clearly applicable doctrine, we begin 
with a review of the basic law of claim preclusion. 
 
In Board of Trustees of Trucking Employees Welfare Fund, 
Inc. v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1992), we explained 
that claim preclusion (or res judicata as it is also called) 
"gives dispositive effect to a prior judgment if a particular 
issue, although not litigated, could have been raised in the 
earlier proceeding. Claim preclusion requires: (1) afinal 
judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving; (2) the 
same parties or their privities; and (3) a subsequent suit 
based on the same cause of action." Centra, 983 F.2d at 
504 (emphasis added; citations omitted). If these three 
factors are present, a claim that was or could have been 
raised previously must be dismissed as precluded. 
 
We have elaborated on the third element of the Centra 
test, both in general and in the context of bankruptcy 
proceedings. In deciding whether two suits are based on the 
same "cause of action," we take a broad view, looking to 
whether there is an "essential similarity of the underlying 
events giving rise to the various legal claims." United States 
v. Athlone Indus., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984); see 
also Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 24 cmt. a ("The 
present trend is to see claim in factual [as opposed to legal] 
terms and to make it coterminous with the transaction 
regardless of the number of substantive theories . .. that 
may be available to the plaintiff . . . ."); id. cmt. b ("In 
general, the expression [`transaction'] connotes a natural 
grouping or common nucleus of operative facts."). Because 
a "bankruptcy case" is fundamentally different from the 
typical civil action, however, comparison of a bankruptcy 
proceeding with another proceeding is not susceptible to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Another way of looking at it might be that CoreStates's claim should 
be barred by reason of S 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 
S 1141(a), which provides that a confirmed plan is binding on all 
creditors, including feuding creditors such as CoreStates and Huls, who 
litigated the fairness of the Plan as affected by the disputed payment. 
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the standard res judicata analysis. "Rather, we scrutinize 
the totality of the circumstances in each action and then 
determine whether the primary test of Athlone, i.e., 
essential similarity in the underlying events, has been 
satisfied." Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 
848 F.2d 414, 419 n.5 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
The principle of claim preclusion applies to final orders 
overruling objections to a reorganization plan in bankruptcy 
proceedings just as it does to any other final judgment on 
a claim. See Wallis v. Justice Oaks II, Ltd. (In re Justice 
Oaks II, Ltd.), 898 F.2d 1544, 1552 (11th Cir. 1990) 
("Because the claims raised in the Wallises' adversary 
complaint were already raised, or could have been raised, 
in their objection to confirmation, we hold that the doctrine 
of claim preclusion bars them from relitigating those 
claims."); see also Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 334 
(1966) ("The normal rules of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel apply to the decisions of bankruptcy courts."); 
Donaldson v. Bernstein, 104 F.3d 547, 554 (3d Cir. 1997) 
("[A] confirmation order is res judicata as to all issues 
decided or which could have been decided at the hearing on 
confirmation." (quoting In re Szostek, 886 F.2d 1405, 1408 
(3d Cir. 1989))); Crop-Maker Soil Servs. v. Fairmount St. 
Bank, 881 F.2d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Public policy 
supports res judicata generally, but in the bankruptcy 
context in particular."); cf. 11 U.S.C.S 1141(a) ("[T]he 
provisions of a confirmed plan bind . . . any creditor . . . 
whether or not the claim or interest of such creditor . . . is 
impaired under the plan and whether or not such creditor 
. . . has accepted the plan."). Accordingly, we ordinarily 
would simply apply these rules. CoreStates suggests two 
reasons why we should not.5 We address these in turn. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. CoreStates also submits that claim preclusion should not apply 
because the bankruptcy proceeding did not modify or adjudicate its 
rights under the Agreement. This argument misapprehends the 
fundamental nature of the doctrine of claim preclusion, which applies 
whether or not the particular issue was actually raised or decided by the 
prior court. See Agrilectric Power Partners, Ltd. v. General Elec. Co., 20 
F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 1994). The continued effectiveness of the contract is 
simply irrelevant. Of course, if CoreStates's claim had not accrued before 
the Bankruptcy Judge confirmed UCT's Plan of Reorganization, then 
whether the Plan had modified the Agreement would be important. 
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III. Claim Preclusion: Non-Core Claims and Claims 
       Between Creditors 
 
CoreStates's submissions raise legitimate questions as to 
the extent to which claim preclusion applies to bankruptcy 
orders and judgments. The thrust of its contentions is in 
the nature of a caveat that, because bankruptcy 
jurisdiction is so comprehensive, and a bankruptcy 
proceeding potentially can be so broad, its preclusive effect 
should be limited. We address two questions CoreStates 
poses about the claim preclusive effect of a bankruptcy 
judge's orders rejecting objections to reorganization plans: 
whether the doctrine should preclude claims that would 
have fallen within the non-core "related" -- as opposed to 
the core -- bankruptcy jurisdiction, and whether it should 
apply to the claims of a creditor who objects to a 
bankruptcy reorganization plan. We believe that these 
suggested limitations on the application of claim preclusion 
are unnecessary, and that claim preclusion should apply 
regardless of the jurisdictional basis of the present claim 
and between all parties to a bankruptcy case. 
 
A. Claim Preclusion and Non-Core Claims 
 
The first question is whether claim preclusion should 
apply if CoreStates's claim falls within the non-core 
"related" bankruptcy jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a court 
hearing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization case is 
broad. This jurisdiction is delineated in 28 U.S.C. SS 157 & 
1334. Title 28 initially grants jurisdiction over all aspects of 
a bankruptcy case to the district courts. See 28 U.S.C. 
S 1334.6 Section 157(a) then permits the district courts to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Section 1334 provides as follows: 
 
        (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the 
       district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of 
all 
       cases under title 11. 
 
        (b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive 
       jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, 
the 
       district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction 
of all 
       civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related 
to 
       cases under title 11. 
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automatically refer any proceedings over which they have 
jurisdiction under S 1334 to the bankruptcy courts.7 See, 
e.g., Bankruptcy Administration Orders (E.D. Pa. July 25, 
1984, Nov. 8, 1990) (using the District Court's full 
authority to refer cases to bankruptcy judges under 
S157(a)). Section 157(b)(1) provides that "[b]ankruptcy 
judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and 
all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a 
case under title 11, referred under subsection [157(a)], and 
may enter appropriate orders and judgments . . . ." 
 
Along with those listed in the statute,8  "a proceeding is 
core under section 157 if it invokes a substantive right 
provided by title 11 or if it is a proceeding that, by its 
nature, could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy 
case." Torkelsen v. Maggio (In re Guild & Gallery Plus, Inc.), 
72 F.3d 1171, 1178 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting In re Marcus 
Hook Dev. Park, Inc., 943 F.2d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(citations omitted)). Bankruptcy judges may also hear non- 
core proceedings that are otherwise related to a bankruptcy 
case. See S 157(c)(1) ("A bankruptcy judge may hear a 
proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is 
otherwise related to a case under title 11."). 
 
A claim is a non-core "related" claim if its 
 
       outcome . . . could conceivably have any effect on the 
       estate being administered in bankruptcy. Thus, the 
       proceeding need not necessarily be against the debtor 
       or against the debtor's property. An action is related to 
       bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor's 
       rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either 
       positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts 
       upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt 
       estate. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Section 157(a) provides: "Each district court may provide that any or 
all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 
or arising in or related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the 
bankruptcy judges for the district." 
 
8. Section 157(b)(2) presents a nonexclusive list of core proceedings, 
including "determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens." 
S 157(b)(2)(K). 
 
                                12 
  
Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(emphasis and citations omitted). In non-core claims, 
however, the bankruptcy judge may not enter final orders 
or judgments, but must submit proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law to the district court for entry of 
judgment, see 28 U.S.C. S 157(c)(1),9 unless all the parties 
consent to the bankruptcy judge's entering judgment, see 
S 157(c)(2).10 
 
This distinction between core and non-core proceedings 
dates to the Supreme Court case of Northern Pipeline 
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
The principles of Northern Pipeline are familiar, and are 
described in the margin.11 Although CoreStates does not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Section 157(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part: 
 
       In [a non-core] proceeding, the bankruptcy judge shall submit 
       proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district 
       court, and any final order or judgment shall be entered by the 
       district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge's proposed 
       findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters 
       to which any party has timely and specifically objected. 
 
10. Section 157(c)(2) provides: 
 
        Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this 
subsection, 
       the district court, with the consent of all the parties to the 
       proceeding, may refer a proceeding related to a case under title 11 
       to a bankruptcy judge to hear and determine and to enter 
       appropriate orders and judgments . . . . 
 
11. A Chapter 11 debtor brought claims before a bankruptcy judge 
against a creditor for breach of contract and warranty, 
misrepresentation, coercion, and duress, under the jurisdictional 
provisions of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. Those provisions granted 
bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over all "civil proceedings arising under 
title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11." 458 U.S. at 
54 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. S 1471(b) (1976 ed. Supp. IV)) (emphasis and 
alteration in original). The Court concluded that this grant of 
jurisdiction 
over proceedings merely "related to" bankruptcy cases to non-Article III 
bankruptcy judges violated the Constitution. This decision rested on the 
notion that non-Article III judges may only hear cases involving public, 
congressionally created rights, but not claims based on private common- 
law rights. See 458 U.S. at 80-84 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 
51-65 (1932)). The protections afforded a debtor under the Bankruptcy 
Code are congressionally created public rights. The debtor's breach of 
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argue that section 157 is constitutionally problematic in 
light of Northern Pipeline, some courts and commentators 
have questioned whether claim preclusion can apply to 
non-core claims that could have been raised in a 
bankruptcy proceeding. More specifically, the Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits have held that a subsequent claim is not 
barred by a confirmation order from a bankruptcy 
proceeding in which the present claim could have been 
raised only under section 157's non-core "related" 
jurisdiction. See Barnett v. Stern, 909 F.2d 973, 978-79 
(7th Cir. 1990); Howell Hydrocarbons, Inc. v. Adams, 897 
F.2d 183, 189 (5th Cir. 1990); see also George A. Martinez, 
The Res Judicata Effect of Bankruptcy Court Judgments: 
The Procedural and Constitutional Concerns, 62 Mo. L. Rev. 
9 (1997). 
 
Ordinarily, a party will not be precluded from raising a 
claim by a prior adjudication if the party did not have the 
opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the claim. See 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 26(1)(c). The courts in 
Barnett and Howell reasoned that, because a bankruptcy 
judge could not, under section 157(c)(1), finally adjudicate 
a non-core claim, a party to such a confirmation proceeding 
would not have an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate a 
claim "related to" the bankruptcy case. Accordingly, they 
concluded that a confirmation order does not have a claim 
preclusive effect on a claim that would have been brought 
under non-core "related" jurisdiction and adjudicated 
within the constraints of section 157(c). See Barnett, 909 
F.2d at 979; Howell, 897 F.2d at 189. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
contract claim, along with the other claims the debtor brought, however, 
involved only private common-law rights, and thus could not be 
adjudicated in a non-Article III court. 
 
In response to the Northern Pipeline decision, Congress enacted the 
jurisdiction provisions currently set forth in 28 U.S.C. SS 157 & 1334. 
See Bankruptcy Amendments & Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 344. As seen above, these provisions differ from 
those at issue in Northern Pipeline primarily in that they limit a 
bankruptcy judge's ability to issue final orders and judgments in cases 
brought under the non-core "related" jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. S157(c). 
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We disagree, believing that an order rejecting an 
objection to a reorganization plan in a bankruptcy 
proceeding has a claim preclusive effect on a claim that 
could have been brought in that proceeding by the objector, 
even if only under the non-core "related" bankruptcy 
jurisdiction. Our conclusion in this regard is consistent 
with those of the Second, Sixth and Ninth Circuits. See, 
e.g., Robertson v. Isomedix, Inc. (In re Intl. Nutronics, Inc.), 
28 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 1994); Sanders Confectionery Prods., 
Inc. v. Heller Fin., Inc., 973 F.2d 474, 482-83 (6th Cir. 
1992); Sure-Snap Corp. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 948 
F.2d 869, 873 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Ralph E. Avery, 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Principles of Res Judicata, 102 
Com. L.J. 257, 286-88 (1997). These courts have observed 
that, even though a bankruptcy judge could not 
conclusively determine a non-core proceeding, the 
bankruptcy judge and the district court together could do 
so, and this was sufficient to permit full and fair litigation 
of the non-core claim. Accordingly, these courts have 
concluded that a confirmation order could have claim 
preclusive effect even on non-core "related" claims that 
could have been raised alongside an objection in the 
confirmation proceeding. See Robertson, 28 F.3d at 969; 
Sanders, 973 F.2d at 482. 
 
We thus conclude that the restrictions on a bankruptcy 
judge's judicial power with respect to non-core"related" 
claims do not limit the effect of the doctrine of claim 
preclusion. This depends on our interpretation of section 26 
of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. See Venuto v. 
Witco Corp., 117 F.3d 754, 758-59 (3d Cir. 1997) (relying on 
section 26 in analyzing federal law of claim preclusion). 
Section 26 provides, in pertinent part: 
 
        When any of the following circumstances exists, the 
       [doctrine of claim preclusion] does not apply to 
       extinguish the claim, and part or all of the claim 
       subsists as a possible basis for a second action by the 
       plaintiff against the defendant: 
 
        . . . . 
 
        The plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of 
       the case or to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in 
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       the first action because of the limitations on the 
       subject matter jurisdiction of the courts or restrictions 
       on their authority to entertain multiple theories or 
       demands for multiple remedies or forms of relief in a 
       single action, and the plaintiff desires in the second 
       action to rely on that theory or to seek that remedy or 
       form of relief. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 26(1)(c). Claim 
preclusion should therefore apply only where "the 
jurisdiction in which the first judgment was rendered was 
one which put no formal barriers in the way of a litigant's 
presenting to a court in one action the entire claim, 
including any theories of recovery or demands for relief that 
might have been available to him under applicable law." 
Restatement S 26 cmt. c. 
 
The comments to the Restatement discuss two primary 
types of cases in which this limitation applies. First, they 
discuss a case in which the first judgment is in a state 
court, and the plaintiff then brings a second action in 
federal court under a statute that gives federal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction. In such a case, the Supreme Court 
has held that the later federal action is not barred by claim 
preclusion. See Marrese v. American Acad. of Orthop. 
Surgs., 470 U.S. 373 (1985); Restatement S 26 cmt. c, illus. 
2. Second, the Restatement explains that a later action is 
not barred by a prior action when the court hearing the 
first action had personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
only as to the theory of the first action, but not for that on 
which the second action is predicated. See Restatement 
S 26 cmt. c. 
 
We think the exceptions set forth in section 26(1)(c) of the 
Restatement are inapplicable to the case at bar. A 
bankruptcy judge's jurisdiction over a non-core "related" 
claim is not limited in the sense of that section. Section 
26(1)(c) applies to limitations on the types of theories, 
remedies, or relief available if a claim is brought in a 
particular forum. But bringing a non-core "related" claim 
before a bankruptcy judge does not in any way limit the 
available theories, remedies, or relief. Cf. Celotex Corp. v. 
Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 309 n.7 (1995) (rejecting the 
argument that a bankruptcy judge does not have the power 
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to issue an injunction barring an action in a different 
district court). A bankruptcy judge is perfectly capable of 
recommending, and the district court of awarding, 
judgment based on any theory, remedy, or relief, just as if 
the claim had been brought originally before a district 
court, or even a state court of general jurisdiction, outside 
of a bankruptcy proceeding. 
 
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits' main concern seems to 
be that since a bankruptcy judge cannot conclusively 
reward relief in a non-core proceeding, the judge does not 
have jurisdiction over non-core claims. See Howell, 897 
F.2d at 189 ("Moreover, the bankruptcy court would not 
have had jurisdiction over the [non-core `related'] claims 
against the defendants."). This concern, however, misses 
the basic point that, like magistrate judges, bankruptcy 
judges have no jurisdiction over any cases. In any 
bankruptcy proceeding, jurisdiction over the case rests with 
the district court; proceedings are only referred to the 
bankruptcy judges for consideration. See Sanders, 973 F.2d 
at 483 ("Although the bankruptcy court would not have 
subject matter jurisdiction over a non-core related 
proceeding, the action would still be within the district 
court's jurisdiction."). In addition, the district courts retain 
the power to withdraw the reference at any time. See 28 
U.S.C. S 157(d). 
 
Likewise, even assuming that the bankruptcy judge has 
jurisdiction in some sense, the restraints that section 
157(c) imposes on the judge's power to dispose of a non- 
core claim do not bring it within the ambit of section 
26(1)(c) of the Restatement. Jurisdiction is different from 
judicial power.12 A limitation on judicial power is not a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. See American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re 
American Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Subject 
matter jurisdiction and power are separate prerequisites to the court's 
capacity to act. Subject matter jurisdiction is the court's authority to 
entertain an action between the parties before it. Power . . . is the 
scope 
and forms of relief the court may order in an action in which it has 
jurisdiction."); Holly's, Inc. v. City of Kentwood (In re Holly's, Inc.), 
172 
B.R. 545, 554 n.9 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994), affd., 178 B.R. 711 (W.D. 
Mich. 1995); Gray v. Hall, 265 P. 246, 251 (Cal. 1928) ("Jurisdiction has 
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limitation on jurisdiction. Section 157(c) only limits a 
bankruptcy judge's power to grant relief, not jurisdiction 
over a proceeding requesting such relief. Since section 26(c) 
of the Restatement speaks only of jurisdiction, it does not 
limit the preclusive effect of a confirmation of a 
reorganization plan over objection on a subsequent claim 
that could have been brought during the confirmation 
proceeding as a non-core "related" claim. See Restatement 
S 24 cmt. g (limits on the power of a court to grant a 
remedy do not affect the claim preclusive effect of its 
judgments). Accordingly, we agree with the Second, Sixth 
and Ninth Circuits that a prior confirmation order has 
claim preclusive effect with respect to a claim that could 
have been brought as a non core "related" proceeding 
during the confirmation proceeding. 
 
This is not to say, of course, that claim preclusion will 
apply to all claims with any factual connection to issues 
raised in the bankruptcy proceeding. Under section 26 of 
the Restatement, the claim must fall within the bankruptcy 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, claim preclusion will only apply if 
the claim is at least "related to" the bankruptcy case, 28 
U.S.C. SS 157 & 1334, i.e., if it "could conceivably have any 
effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy," 
Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994 (emphasis and citations omitted). A 
party to a bankruptcy would not be precluded from later 
bringing a claim that could not conceivably have had any 
effect on the bankruptcy estate. 
 
B. Claim Preclusion Between Creditors 
 
CoreStates contends that claim preclusion cannot apply 
to claims between creditors in a bankruptcy confirmation 
proceeding. It relies on the fact that a party in a civil action 
is not precluded from litigating a claim simply because it 
had an opportunity to raise the claim as a cross-claim in a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
often been said to be `the power to hear and determine.' It is in truth 
the 
power to do both or either -- to hear without determining or to 
determine without hearing."); see also In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d 
1043, 1045 (7th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing between challenges to a 
court's jurisdiction and challenges to its power). 
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prior suit to which it was a party. See United States v. 
Berman, 884 F.2d 916, 923 n.9 (6th Cir. 1989); Peterson v. 
Watt, 666 F.2d 361, 363 (9th Cir. 1982); 6 Charles Alan 
Wright et al., Federal Practice & ProcedureS 1431, at 236 
(2d ed. 1990) ("A party who decides not to bring his claim 
[as a cross-claim] will not be barred by res judicata . . . 
from asserting it in a later action, as he would if the claim 
were a compulsory counterclaim . . . ."); cf. Charter Oak Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 750 F.2d 267, 
270 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that, under Pennsylvania law, 
claim preclusion bars the litigation of a claim that actually 
was raised as a cross-claim in a prior proceeding). 
 
CoreStates is of course correct that, in general, a creditor 
who does not raise a claim against another party to the 
bankruptcy proceeding cannot be precluded from later 
asserting a claim. The question is, whether, for claim 
preclusion purposes, a creditor's, such as CoreStates's, 
objection to a reorganization plan can state a claim against 
another creditor, such as Huls, whose rights under the 
proposed plan the objection concerns. We conclude that in 
particular circumstances, such as those present here, it 
can. 
 
A cause of action is defined by its factual contours. As 
noted above, two claims involve the same cause of action if 
there is "an essential similarity of the underlying events 
giving rise to the various legal claims." Athlone, 746 F.2d at 
984; see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 24 
cmts. a, b. Because a "bankruptcy case" is fundamentally 
different from the typical civil action, however, comparison 
of a bankruptcy proceeding with another later proceeding is 
not susceptible to the standard res judicata analysis. 
"Rather, we scrutinize the totality of the circumstances in 
each action and then determine whether the primary test of 
Athlone, i.e., essential similarity in the underlying events 
has been satisfied." Oneida, 848 F.2d at 419 n.5. 
 
As noted above, claim preclusion traditionally has not 
acted as a bar to the later litigation of a claim by a party 
who has not actively raised a claim based on the same 
cause of action in a prior proceeding.13  See Peterson, 666 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The Restatement provides two limited exceptions to this rule, in 
addition to the case discussed in the text where the defendant interposes 
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F.2d at 363; cf. Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 22(1) 
("Where the defendant may interpose a claim as a 
counterclaim but he fails to do so, he is not thereby 
precluded from subsequently maintaining an action on that 
claim [with certain exceptions]."); id. S 38 cmt. a ("Where no 
[cross- or counter-] pleadings have been interposed, the 
possibility of merger and bar by definition does not arise."). 
Where a party interposes such a claim, however, the party 
becomes a plaintiff for claim preclusion purposes. See 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 23 cmt. a ("A 
defendant who interposes a counterclaim is, in substance, 
a plaintiff, as far as the counterclaim is concerned. . . ."). 
Accordingly, claim preclusion applies to the claims of a 
party who asserts any claim in an action, even where the 
party is not the original plaintiff. See Fowler v. Vineyard, 
405 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1991); 18 Wright et al., supra, S 4450, 
at 425 ("Preclusion should apply according to ordinary 
rules between any parties who tried a claim between 
themselves."). 
 
A party who raises an objection to a reorganization plan 
in a confirmation proceeding has interposed a claim in the 
sense just discussed. Under 11 U.S.C. S 1128(b), "[a] party 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
a counterclaim. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 22(2). First, a 
defendant cannot bring a claim in a later proceeding if it could have 
been brought as a compulsory counterclaim in an earlier proceeding to 
which a compulsory counterclaim statute or rule applied. See S 22(2)(a). 
This exception will not ordinarily apply to bankruptcy confirmation 
orders, however, because a confirmation proceeding is a contested 
matter to which no compulsory counterclaim rule applies. See Fed. R. 
Bankr. P. 3020(b)(1), 9014. Second, a defendant in a case that proceeds 
to judgment cannot bring a later claim if "[t]he relationship between the 
counterclaim and the [later] claim is such that successful prosecution of 
the second action would nullify the initial judgment or would impair 
rights established in the initial action." See S 22(2)(b). Under this 
latter 
exception, even if a creditor did not proffer an objection to a plan 
confirmation, it would still be precluded from bringing a later claim 
based on the same cause of action if a judgment in its favor on the later 
claim would effectively nullify the effects of the confirmation order. 
See, 
e.g., Sure-Snap, 948 F.2d at 874-76. Since we can decide this case 
without considering these exceptions, we need not and do not decide 
whether and how they apply to bankruptcy plan confirmation orders. 
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in interest may object to the confirmation of a plan." A 
claim is a "[m]eans by or through which claimant obtains 
possession or enjoyment of [a] privilege or thing." Black's 
Law Dictionary 247 (6th ed. 1990). By asserting an 
objection, a creditor asserts its privilege of having its 
interests in the bankruptcy estate settled in a plan that 
satisfies the requirements of S 1129. Furthermore, an 
objection requires the bankruptcy judge to adjudicate 
whether a proposed plan of reorganization meets the 
requirements of S 1129. 
 
We also observe that, procedurally, an objection to a plan 
may possess all the hallmarks of a claim. An objection 
requires the bankruptcy judge to adjudicate whether a plan 
meets the requirements for confirmation. See 11 U.S.C. 
S 1129. Such an objection must be filed with the court and 
served on all parties to the confirmation proceeding. See 
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3020(b)(1). The filing of an objection gives 
rise to a contested matter, see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3020(b)(1), 
in which the many of the familiar rules of civil procedure 
apply, including the rules of discovery, see Fed. R. Bankr. 
P. 9014. A confirmation order rejecting objections is a final 
adjudication sufficient to preclude later claims. See Stoll v. 
Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1938); Szostek, 886 F.2d at 
1409-10. 
 
Furthermore, we think that an objection can be a claim 
against other creditors, as well as the debtor, for claim 
preclusion purposes. A claimant may be bound under the 
doctrine of claim preclusion by a judgment on a claim 
against another party not named as its adversary if they are 
adversaries in fact. See Sullivan v. Easco Corp., 662 F. 
Supp. 1396, 1408 (D. Md. 1987); 18 Wright et al., supra, 
S 4450, at 420; cf. Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 38 
("Parties who are not adversaries to each other under the 
pleadings in an action involving them and a third party are 
bound by and entitled to the benefits of issue preclusion 
with respect to issues they actually litigate fully and fairly 
as adversaries and which are essential to the judgment 
rendered."). Parties are adversaries if they have"opposing 
interests, . . . interests for the preservation of which 
opposition is essential." Black's Law Dictionary, supra, at 
53. 
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An objection frequently puts into question the interests of 
specific non-objecting creditors under a proposed plan. In 
order to preserve these interests, these non-objecting 
creditors then have the right to oppose the objections in a 
hearing.14 We think it beyond cavil that these non-objecting 
creditors -- whose rights in the estate may be affected by 
the objection -- are fairly denominated adversaries of the 
objecting creditor. Accordingly, we think that claim 
preclusion should bar an objecting creditor such as 
CoreStates from litigating in a later proceeding claims 
against a non-objecting creditor in the circumstances 
present here. 
 
The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 
Wallis. There, creditors objected to a plan on the grounds 
that a certain lender had engaged in unfair conduct in 
obtaining a security interest in the bankruptcy estate, and 
also that the lender's security interest was really a 
partnership interest. These objections were rejected. The 
creditors later brought a separate claim against the lender 
alleging that the lender engaged in fraud and that the 
lender was not a secured creditor. The court held that these 
claims were barred by claim preclusion. 
 
        The Wallises' objection was overruled, and they failed 
       to appeal the order. The Wallises' adversary complaint 
       essentially brings an impermissible collateral attack on 
       the order confirming the plan. Because the claims 
       raised in the Wallises' adversary complaint were 
       already raised, or could have been raised, in their 
       objection to confirmation, we hold that the doctrine of 
       claim preclusion bars them from relitigating those 
       claims. 
 
Wallis, 898 F.2d at 1552 (footnote omitted). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. For example, one creditor might object to a reorganization plan on 
the ground that another creditor had become secured as a result of 
fraud, and therefore its interest should be treated as unsecured. If the 
bankruptcy judge sustained the objection and refused to confirm the 
plan, any future proposed plan would presumably be prohibited from 
treating the second creditor as secured. Accordingly, that creditor would 
have standing and good reason to oppose the objection. 
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C. The Limiting Principle that the Two Claims Must  Arise 
       out of "Same Cause of Action" 
 
Although we have rejected these two extrinsic limitations 
on the applicability of claim preclusion, our holding is 
actually a narrow one. Although fact-bound, it is also well 
within the confines of claim preclusion doctrine. As noted 
above, claim preclusion only applies to claims that would 
have been within the bankruptcy court jurisdiction, i.e., 
those that are at least "related to" the bankruptcy case. See 
supra section III.A. In addition, except possibly in unusual 
circumstances, it only applies to creditors who raise a claim 
in the bankruptcy proceeding contrary to the interests of 
another specific creditor. See supra section III.B. Finally, 
the Centra test for claim preclusion provides an additional 
limit on the preclusive effect of bankruptcy confirmation 
orders over objections. These three intrinsic limitations 
provide an appropriate and sufficient limit on the preclusive 
effect of the rejection of objections to bankruptcy plans 
than the putative restraints we reject above. See supra 
sections III.A & B. Since we have already discussed the 
jurisdictional limitations on the doctrine and the 
requirement that the party to be precluded have previously 
raised a claim, we need now discuss only the restraint the 
Centra test provides. 
 
Under Centra, a subsequent claim is barred only if it 
arises out of "the same cause of action" as that litigated in 
the first action. See Centra, 983 F.2d at 504. Where the 
first case is a bankruptcy proceeding, we "scrutinize the 
totality of the circumstances in each action," Oneida, 848 
F.2d at 419 n.5, to ascertain whether there is an "essential 
similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various 
legal claims," Athlone Indus., 746 F.2d at 984. We think the 
"essential similarity" requirement sufficiently limits the 
claim preclusive effect of final orders concerning objections 
to bankruptcy reorganization plan confirmations. 
 
We note that some judges and commentators have 
expressed concern that claim preclusion has been applied 
where the two actions are not sufficiently factually 
connected. See Oneida, 848 F.2d at 422 (Stapleton, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that claim preclusion should not apply 
because no matter what the judgment in the second case, 
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it could not be inconsistent with the confirmation order); 
see also Martinez, supra, 62 Mo. L. Rev. at 26-27. But 
where the evidence required to prove a new claim would 
have been largely immaterial in a prior confirmation 
proceeding, we doubt that there will be an "essential 
similarity of the underlying events" as required to give rise 
to claim preclusion. See Facchiano Constr. Co. v. United 
States Dept. of Labor, 987 F.2d 206, 212-13 (3d Cir. 1993) 
("whether the material facts alleged are the same" is a key 
factor in determining whether claim preclusion applies; 
claim preclusion did not apply where the two claims rested 
on "different evidence"); Athlone Indus., 746 F.2d at 984 
(same). 
 
Similarly, some commentators have complained that 
claims falling within the non-core, "related" bankruptcy 
jurisdiction often raise factual issues "totally unrelated" to 
the confirmation proceeding. See Martinez, supra, 62 Mo. L. 
Rev. at 26-27. Accordingly, the argument goes, claim 
preclusion should not apply, because it would be no more 
efficient to try non-core "related" proceedings in conjunction 
with a confirmation hearing. Of course, a confirmation 
proceeding should not bar a subsequent action based on 
facts totally unrelated to objections raised in the 
confirmation proceeding. But we think it is wrong to 
assume as a result that all non-core claims will be factually 
unrelated to objections raised in the confirmation 
proceeding in which they could have been brought. 
 
In short, we conclude that where the factual 
underpinnings of the subsequent claim are not essentially 
the same as those of the claims raised in the confirmation 
proceeding, the latter should not have a claim preclusive 
effect on the former. But, as this case demonstrates, see 
infra Part IV, not all non-core claims or claims between 
creditors are factually unrelated to objections adjudicated 
in confirmation proceedings that assertedly preclude them. 
Other courts have applied claim preclusion in situations 
that likewise provide excellent examples of the potential for 
close factual relationships between claims in bankruptcy 
proceedings and non-core claims, on the one hand, and 
claims between creditors, on the other. See, e.g., Robertson, 
28 F.3d at 970-71 (applying claim preclusion to non-core 
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claim); Crop-Maker, 881 F.2d at 440 (applying claim 
preclusion between creditors). Accordingly, we turn to a 
discussion of the application of the principles set forth 
above in the admittedly unusual circumstances of the case 
before us. 
 
IV. Is the Claim Under the Subordination Agreement 
       Precluded on the Facts? 
 
Applying the precepts set forth above, we conclude that 
CoreStates's claim under the Subordination Agreement is 
precluded. 
 
A. Could CoreStates Have Raised its Present Claim in the 
       Bankruptcy Proceeding? 
 
Claim preclusion does not apply unless the present claim 
was or could have been raised in the prior proceeding. See 
Centra, 983 F.2d at 504. Accordingly, we must inquire 
whether CoreStates could have raised its claim before the 
Bankruptcy Judge. As we have suggested above, CoreStates 
functionally raised the Subordination Agreement in its 
objection to the Reorganization Plan. Since it did not 
formally interpose it, however, and the parties have 
proceeded as though it did not, we begin with a discussion 
of whether the legal issue here falls within the scope of a 
bankruptcy judge's jurisdiction. We then analyze whether, 
as a factual matter, that issue could have been raised in 
the bankruptcy proceeding. We conclude that there was no 
reason CoreStates could not have brought its current claim 
before the Bankruptcy Judge.15 
 
1. Bankruptcy Jurisdiction 
 
The question before us is whether a creditor's rights as 
against another creditor under a subordination agreement 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. We note that CoreStates's appellate counsel, when pressed by the 
panel at oral argument, conceded with the benefit of hindsight, but 
without abandoning his legal position, that the claim based on the 
Subordination Agreement probably should have been raised by trial 
counsel during the bankruptcy proceeding. 
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fall within the bankruptcy jurisdiction. Our circuit 
precedent suggests that the enforcement of a subordination 
agreement between creditors may not qualify as a core 
proceeding. "[A] proceeding is core under section 157 if it 
invokes a substantive right provided by title 11 or if it is a 
proceeding that, by its nature, could arise only in the 
context of a bankruptcy case." See Torkelsen, 72 F.3d at 
1178. One could reasonably suppose that CoreStates's 
claim meets this standard because it in effect concerns the 
extent and priority of Huls's interest in the bankruptcy 
estate. In fact, the Second Circuit seems to have reached 
just this conclusion. In Resolution Trust Co. v. Best 
Products Co. (In re Best Products Co.), 68 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 
1995), which involved a dispute over the enforcement of a 
contractual subordination agreement between creditors of a 
Chapter 11 debtor, the court found that while enforcing 
subordination agreements is "not listed as a core 
proceeding, the power to prioritize distributions has long 
been recognized as an essential element of bankruptcy 
law." Id. at 31. Furthermore, the court reasoned: 
 
       [T]he Subordination Agreement . . . sets forth the 
       relative priority of Best's obligations. Moreover, the fact 
       that Best filed briefs and argued in favor of enforcing 
       the Subordination Agreement in both the district court 
       and this court belies the claim that Best had no 
       interest in the controversy. Determination of the 
       priority rights of various creditors to assets of the 
       Debtor was necessary to administer the estate and was 
       not merely a dispute between two creditors. 
 
Id. at 32. 
 
But an argument could also be made that the core 
jurisdiction standard is not satisfied here. Even if that is 
true, however, the claim based on the Subordination 
Agreement easily satisfies the requirements for the non-core 
"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. See Pacor, 743 F.2d at 
994. Pacor only requires that "the outcome of that 
proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate 
being administered in bankruptcy" in order to invoke non- 
core "related to" jurisdiction. See Torkelsen, 72 F.3d at 
1180-81 (quoting Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994). The court in 
Pacor further observed that "the proceeding need not 
 
                                26 
  
necessarily be against the debtor or against the debtor's 
property. An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome 
could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or 
freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and which 
in any way impacts upon the handling and administration 
of the bankrupt estate." 743 F.2d at 994. We have further 
noted that the "key word in [the Pacor test] is conceivable. 
Certainty, or even likelihood, is not a requirement. 
Bankruptcy jurisdiction will exist so long as it is possible 
that a proceeding may impact on the debtor's rights, 
liabilities, options, or freedom of action or the handling and 
administration of the bankruptcy estate." Torkelsen, 72 
F.3d at 1181 (quoting Marcus Hook, 943 F.2d at 264) 
(alteration in original). 
 
Although CoreStates submits that the dispute is entirely 
between itself and Huls -- and thus does not impact the 
debtor at all -- we believe it clear that the resolution of this 
dispute conceivably would have impacted upon the debtor's 
options in crafting a plan that met with Huls's approval and 
thereby affected the handling of the bankruptcy estate. If 
Huls had known that the $600,000 the Reorganization Plan 
set aside for it was not going to be there "up front," Huls 
might not have consented to the Plan. Indeed, we cannot 
overlook that Huls gave up a claim for over $3,000,000 in 
debt, most of which was secured, in exchange for a cash 
payment of $600,000. Although junior to CoreStates's, we 
gather that Huls's largely secured claim had real value and 
was not simply pie in the sky. Without Huls's consent, UCT 
might have had a much more difficult time having the Plan 
confirmed. Likewise, if CoreStates had litigated its rights 
under the Agreement in the bankruptcy proceeding and 
lost, it might have fought more strenuously against 
ultimate confirmation of the Plan, rather than, for example, 
choosing not to appeal the second confirmation order. We 
conclude that CoreStates's claim is of the type that falls 
within the non-core "related," if not the core, jurisdiction of 
a court sitting in bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
2. Could CoreStates Have Sued Huls While the 
       Bankruptcy Confirmation was Still Pending? 
 
Of course, even if an issue is of a type that theoretically 
could be raised in a bankruptcy case, claim preclusion only 
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applies if the particular claim at issue actually could have 
been brought in the particular bankruptcy proceeding. On 
the aspect of this consideration relevant here, if the claim 
asserted in a later proceeding between co-creditors could 
not have been raised during the bankruptcy proceeding 
because the cause of action had not yet accrued, the 
plaintiff is not precluded from asserting it in the later 
proceeding. See Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 
308, 314 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[N]ew facts (i.e. events occurring 
after the events giving rise to the earlier claim) may give 
rise to a new claim, which is not precluded by the earlier 
judgment."); Centra, 983 F.2d at 505. Whether a claim 
could have been brought in a bankruptcy confirmation 
proceeding depends on whether the claim is based on pre- 
confirmation or post-confirmation acts. "Claims for post- 
confirmation acts are not barred by the res judicata effect 
of the confirmation order. . . . Creditors whose claims arise 
from and after confirmation are not barred by the event of 
confirmation from asserting such claims, except to the 
extent that they arise from pre-confirmation acts." 
Donaldson, 104 F.3d at 555 (citations and internal 
quotations omitted). 
 
The District Court concluded that the present cause of 
action arose out of pre-confirmation events and could have 
been raised in the bankruptcy proceeding: 
 
       The first amended plan of reorganization dated March 
       27, 1996 and known to all interested parties several 
       months before the initial confirmation order, provided 
       for the $600,000 remittance to Huls rather than 
       CoreStates. In addition, UCT actually paid the 
       $600,000 to Huls in August, 1996, before the final 
       amended plan was confirmed by the bankruptcy 
       judge's order of October 1, 1996. CoreStates also put 
       Huls on notice as early as June 12, 1996 that it was 
       obligated to turn over the funds to CoreStates. June 12 
       was before Huls received the $600,000 and before the 
       final confirmation order. This is simply not a case 
       where CoreStates's claim to the funds in issue was 
       unknown before the bankruptcy proceeding ended. 
 
CoreStates, 1997 WL 560193, at *4 (emphasis added). 
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Our reading of the pleadings confirms the District Court's 
conclusion. Because (a) UCT gave the $600,000 to Huls; (b) 
CoreStates was aware of this; and (c) CoreStates had 
demanded the money, all before the confirmation order was 
issued, we conclude that CoreStates's cause of action based 
on the Subordination Agreement had accrued before the 
confirmation was finalized. The key fact here is that UCT 
paid the $600,000 to Huls before the confirmation of the 
Second Amended Plan. CoreStates's cause of action could 
not accrue until Huls received money from UCT, since Huls 
could not breach the Agreement until it received money 
from UCT and then refused to turn it over to CoreStates. If 
Huls had not received the $600,000 payment until after the 
Plan was confirmed, CoreStates could not have raised its 
claim under the Agreement in the bankruptcy proceeding 
and it would not be precluded from raising it now. In the 
present case, however, Huls received money from UCT and 
in fact failed to turn it over to CoreStates in response to 
CoreStates's demands, all before the final confirmation of 
the Second Amended Plan. Therefore, we agree with the 
District Court's conclusion that CoreStates could have 
raised its present claim in the bankruptcy proceeding. 
 
B. The Centra Factors 
 
Even if CoreStates could have raised its present claim 
before the Bankruptcy Judge, claim preclusion only applies 
if the current claim meets the requirements of Centra. 
"Claim preclusion requires: (1) a final judgment on the 
merits in a prior suit involving; (2) the same parties or their 
privities; and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same 
cause of action." Centra, 983 F.2d at 504. CoreStates 
agrees that the parties in the former and present 
proceedings are the same, and the law supports this 
conclusion. See First Union Comm. Corp. v. Nelson, Mullins, 
Riley & Scarborough (In re Varat Enters., Inc.), 81 F.3d 
1310, 1316 n.6 (4th Cir 1996). As noted above and as 
CoreStates also concedes, it is settled that orders of a 
bankruptcy judge rejecting objections and confirming a 
plan of reorganization are final judgments to which the 
doctrine of claim preclusion applies. See Stoll, 305 U.S. at 
170-71; Szostek, 886 F.2d at 1408. This does not entirely 
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settle the matter, however, because a question remains 
whether CoreStates raised its claim to the $600,000 in the 
bankruptcy proceeding and whether the claim was one 
against Huls. 
 
Raising an objection to a reorganization plan can be a 
claim for claim preclusion purposes. See supra section 
III.B. Furthermore, we think CoreStates's objection was a 
claim against Huls. The objection put Huls's rights in the 
bankruptcy estate into question. The $600,000 payment 
was all Huls was entitled to receive under the 
Reorganization Plan. A challenge to that payment amounted 
to a challenge to Huls's position in the scheme of 
distribution the Plan envisioned. In addition, Huls clearly 
felt that it had an interest in the issue worth preserving, 
since it opposed the objection extensively throughout the 
bankruptcy proceedings. Furthermore, Huls filed a brief in 
opposition to CoreStates's appeal in the District Court, and 
CoreStates filed a reply brief dealing almost solely with 
Huls's arguments. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Judge's 
dismissal of CoreStates's objection and the subsequent 
confirmation of the Plan constitute a final judgment on 
CoreStates's claim against Huls. We thus disagree with the 
dissent that CoreStates did not assert a claim against Huls 
in the bankruptcy proceeding. 
 
The more significant question, then, is whether 
CoreStates's present cause of action is essentially the same 
as that which it raised in its objection to the Plan. We think 
it is apparent that the objection and CoreStates's present 
claim addressed the same factual issue: who should receive 
and retain the $600,000 UCT was prepared to pay. 
Although, as CoreStates contends, its legal claims 
concerning this money may rest on somewhat different 
grounds in the two proceedings, the "same cause of action" 
requirement relates to the factual circumstances underlying 
the claims, not their legal basis. See Athlone Indus., 746 
F.2d at 984 (looking to the "essential similarity of the 
underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims"). 
The event underlying both the objection to the Plan and the 
current claim was the distribution of the $600,000. The 
primary evidence of CoreStates's claim to the money in both 
the bankruptcy proceeding and the present case would be 
the Agreement itself. 
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Although we ordinarily "scrutinize the totality of the 
circumstances" in determining whether two claims are 
based on the same cause of action where the first claim 
arose in a bankruptcy proceeding, see Oneida, 848 F.2d at 
419 n.5, we think the "essential similarity" of CoreStates's 
past and present claims is facially apparent. We thus need 
not engage in any searching scrutiny of the totality of the 
circumstances to conclude that CoreStates's present claim 
meets the third prong of the Centra test. 16 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
In closing, we reiterate that CoreStates's present claims 
are precluded because of the coincidence of several 
unusual circumstances. First, in the bankruptcy 
proceeding, CoreStates and Huls contested at length the 
fairness of the Reorganization Plan to the extent it provided 
for the payment of $600,000 to Huls. CoreStates's present 
claim concerns who is ultimately entitled to receive this 
same money. In the absence of extensive litigation of this 
claim in the confirmation proceeding, CoreStates would not 
now be prevented from bringing its suit. Second, UCT paid 
Huls the $600,000, and CoreStates was aware of and 
objected to this payment, before the bankruptcy 
confirmation proceeding ended in a final confirmation of the 
Plan over CoreStates's objection. Thus, CoreStates could 
have brought its claim as an ancillary to the confirmation 
proceeding. In what we suspect is the more usual case, 
where payments are not made pursuant to reorganization 
plans until they are confirmed finally, an objecting creditor 
could not be expected to bring its claim alongside the 
confirmation proceeding. Primarily because of these two 
particular circumstances, we conclude that CoreStates's 
claim is barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. The dissent contends that the facts CoreStates would need to prove 
in its present claim differ from those it needed to establish in its 
objection to UCT's Reorganization Plan. As is clear from the text, we 
disagree. Furthermore, contra the dissent, we think the precise issue in 
both cases was whether Huls was entitled to receive and retain the 
$600,000 payment. Huls had the absolute right to receive the payment 
only in the most technical sense. 
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order of the District Court granting judgment on the 
pleadings in favor of Huls will be affirmed. 
 
                                32 
  
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, Dissenting: 
 
I agree with the Court that principles of claim preclusion 
can properly be applied with respect to claims falling within 
the non-core jurisdiction, as well as the core jurisdiction, of 
a Bankruptcy Court. I assume, without deciding, that the 
Bankruptcy Court would have had non-core jurisdiction 
over CoreStates' claim against Huls. I further agree that 
principles of claim preclusion can properly be applied with 
respect to crossclaims asserted between creditors in a 
bankruptcy proceeding. 
 
I am constrained to dissent, however, because the Court 
reaches its conclusion that CoreStates' claim against Huls 
is barred only by ignoring well-established principles of 
claim preclusion. While purporting to apply those 
principles, the Court proceeds to fashion an unprecedented 
"entire controversy doctrine" for bankruptcy litigation. 
Because the parameters of this new doctrine are so broad 
and ill defined, I fear that much mischief will be done by 
today's decision. 
 
The Court holds that any claim that could have been 
asserted in a bankruptcy proceeding by anyone objecting to 
confirmation of a plan of reorganization against anyone who 
would benefit from confirmation is barred from being 
asserted in a subsequent proceeding if the facts underlying 
the objections raised in the confirmation proceeding and 
the subsequent claim are "essentially similar." This holding 
ignores the fact that under traditional principles of claim 
preclusion the scope of preclusion arising from a judgment 
is determined by the claim underlying the judgment and is 
limited to the rights asserted between the claimant and the 
party against whom the claim is asserted. 
 
The Court is, of course, correct that modern principles of 
claim preclusion view the concept of a "claim" broadly. 
When "a valid and final judgment rendered in an action 
extinguishes the plaintiffs' claim pursuant to the rules of 
merger or bar . . ., the claim extinguished includes all 
rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with 
respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of 
connected transactions, out of which the action arose." 
Restatement, Judgments 2d, S 24(1). 
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Claim preclusion cannot be applied, however, without 
reference to the party who asserted the claim underlying 
the prior judgment. Thus, a judgment for or against a 
plaintiff in a prior proceeding rarely affects the claims 
assertable by other parties to that proceeding even though 
they may arise out of the same transaction. In the absence 
of a compulsory counterclaim rule or statute, for example, 
a defendant who fails to assert a counterclaim arising out 
of the same transaction is normally not barred from 
pressing his claim in a subsequent proceeding. Id. S 22.1 
The only narrow exception to this rule is where the plaintiff 
in a prior proceeding has secured a favorable judgment on 
her claim and successful prosecution of a second action 
would nullify the initial judgment or would impair rights 
established in the initial action against the defendant. Id. 
S 22(2).2 Since a judgment in the plaintiff 's favor on a claim 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 22 of Restatement, Judgments 2d, provides: 
 
       (1) Where the defendant may interpose a claim as a counterclaim 
       but he fails to do so, he is not thereby precluded from 
subsequently 
       maintaining an action on that claim, except as stated in Subsection 
       (2). 
 
       (2) A defendant who may interpose a claim as a counterclaim in an 
       action but fails to do so is precluded, after the rendition of 
judgment 
       in that action, from maintaining an action on the claim if: 
 
        (a) The counterclaim is required to be interposed by a compulsory 
       counterclaim statute or rule of court, or 
 
        (b) The relationship between the counterclaim and the plaintiff 's 
       claim is such that successful prosecution of the second action 
       would nullify the initial judgment or would impair rights 
established 
       in the initial action. 
 
2. As noted in the commentary to S 22(2): 
 
       For such an occasion to arise, it is not sufficient that the 
       counterclaim grow out of the same transaction or occurrence as the 
       plaintiff's claim, nor is it sufficient that the facts constituting 
a 
       defense also form the basis of the counterclaim. The counterclaim 
       must be such that its successful prosecution in a subsequent action 
       would nullify the judgment, for example, by allowing the defendant 
       to enjoin enforcement of the judgment, or to recover on a 
restitution 
       theory the amount paid pursuant to the judgment (see Illustration 
       9), or by depriving the plaintiff in the first action of property 
rights 
       vested in him under the first judgment (see Illustration 10). . . . 
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establishes rights only as between the plaintiff and the 
opponent of the claim, the rationale for this exception has 
no application when the defendant in the subsequent suit 
is not the original plaintiff. Thus, not surprisingly, there 
appears to be no case in which a judgment on a plaintiff 's 
claim has been held to preclude by merger or bar a claim 
that would have been a crossclaim if asserted in the 
original action. 
 
While a claim preclusion analysis must thus focus on the 
claimant and his or her claim, the universe of "potential 
claimants" is, of course, not limited to the plaintiff in the 
original action. As the majority notes, if a defendant in the 
original action asserts a counterclaim or a crossclaim and 
a final judgment is rendered with respect to that claim, he 
becomes a claimant for purposes of claim preclusion 
analysis. Id. S 23. Thus, had CoreStates asserted a claim 
against Huls in the bankruptcy proceeding, principles of 
claim preclusion could properly be applied with reference to 
that claim. See Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Sumitomo 
Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 750 F.2d 267, 270 (3d Cir. 1984). 
CoreStates asserted no such claim, however. 
 
While I agree that application of principles of claim 
preclusion in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding 
requires flexibility and must take into account the nature of 
the bankruptcy process, those principles cannot fairly be 
stretched far enough to effect a preclusion of CoreStates' 
claim here. In order for claim preclusion to preclude, there 
must be a final judgment in favor of a claimant into which 
the precluded claim has merged or a final judgment for the 
defendant that bars another action by the claimant on the 
same claim. See Restatement, Judgments 2d, SS 18, 19. A 
confirmation order may be viewed as a judgment in favor of 
creditors on their claims against the debtor. To the extent 
claims have been disallowed, it may also be viewed as a 
judgment in the debtor's favor on the disallowed claims. 
Moreover, there is an in rem aspect to the judgment entered 
at the end of a confirmation proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. 
S 1334(a). Under traditional principles of claim preclusion, 
however, none of these judgments would extinguish a claim 
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between creditors who have not raised claims against each 
other in the bankruptcy proceeding.3 
 
In the bankruptcy proceeding, CoreStates asserted no 
right to relief from Huls. Moreover, it claimed no right to 
receive from the debtor's estate the $600,000 ultimately 
received by Huls. It had no such right to assert. 
Accordingly, the only way one can conclude that CoreStates 
made a claim against Huls in the bankruptcy proceeding, 
as the Court does, is to hold that an objection to 
confirmation of a plan of reorganization constitutes a claim 
against anyone who has an economic interest in having the 
plan confirmed. Since virtually all non-objecting creditors 
will have such an interest, this holding will require that any 
party considering an objection canvass the entire universe 
of creditors to determine whether it has a claim against one 
of them that might conceivably be regarded as arising from 
the same or similar underlying events. 
 
The burden thus imposed will be greatly exacerbated by 
the Court's broad vision of what constitutes the same or 
similar underlying events. CoreStates' objection to 
confirmation of the plan was not based, directly or 
indirectly, on its Subordination Agreement with Huls. 
Rather, to the extent it was related to Huls at all, 
CoreStates' objection was based on the claim that the plan 
"discriminate[d] unfairly" among a class of secured 
creditors in violation of section 1129(b). The claim 
CoreStates here seeks to assert is a breach of contract 
claim based on allegations that it entered into a 
Subordination Agreement with Huls which Huls breached 
when it declined to pay $600,000 to CoreStates after it 
received that amount from UCT. The Court fails to 
satisfactorily explain how CoreStates' two claims can 
reasonably be deemed the same cause of action for claim 
preclusion purposes. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. An in rem judgment, of course, is"conclusive as to interests [in the 
res] but does not bind anyone with respect to personal liability." 
Restatement, Judgments 2d, S 30. Here, CoreStates asserts that Huls is 
personally liable to it in the amount of $600,000. It has not, and could 
not, contend that it had a right to receive a $600,000 distribution from 
the assets of the debtor's estate based upon its agreement with Huls. 
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The section 1129(b) claim that CoreStates included in its 
objection to confirmation of the plan was based on the 
respective circumstances of the members of the identified 
class of secured creditors, their treatment under the 
proposed plan, and the feasibility of alternative plans of 
distribution. In contrast, the claim that CoreStates here 
seeks to press is based on the terms of a Subordination 
Agreement entered long before the bankruptcy and the fact 
that Huls received $600,000 from UCT because of UCT debt 
obligations to it. I perceive no "essential similarity of the 
[legally relevant] underlying events giving rise to" these 
claims, and, indeed, I can think of no evidence that would 
be material to both claims. It would not be necessary for 
CoreStates, in proving its breach of contract claim, to even 
refer to the bankruptcy proceeding or the plan of 
reorganization. It would suffice to show only that Huls 
received monies from UCT on account of UCT's debt 
obligation to Huls. The Court seeks to gloss over the 
distinctiveness of these claims by asserting that"the 
objection and CoreStates' present claim addressed the same 
factual issue: who should receive and retain the $600,000 
VCT was prepared to pay." Slip Op. at 30. The fact of the 
matter, however, is that the claim asserted in the 
bankruptcy proceeding had absolutely nothing to do with 
whether Huls was entitled to retain the $600,000 payment 
it would receive under the plan and the claim asserted here 
has absolutely nothing to do with whether Huls was 
entitled to receive $600,000 in the bankruptcy. 
 
Because an objection to a plan will now be regarded as 
making a claim against all who would benefit from 
confirmation and because the concept of a single cause of 
action will now be an elastic one, it will be extraordinarily 
difficult for a creditor in the Third Circuit to determine 
what crossclaims it must or need not assert. Since the 
penalty for a mistaken choice is forfeiture, it is not difficult 
to predict the ultimate result of the Court's holding: 
multitudinous protective filings of claims against non- 
debtors and the needless complication of bankruptcy 
confirmation proceedings. 
 
I would reverse the judgment of the District Court. 
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